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CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 1241.7: PROTECTING PUBLIC
PARKS FROM HIGHWAY INTRUSION
Prior to the addition of section 1241.7 to the California Code of
Civil Procedure in 1968,1 California parks were at the mercy of the
state highway commission 2 to which is delegated the power to determine
the location of state and federal highways.3 Once a location has been
determined by the commission, the Department of Public Works, of
which the highway commission is a division,4 is authorized to con-
demn5 by proceedings in eminent domain6 the designated land and, act-
ing through the Division of Highways, to construct a state highway or
freeway on it.7  Section 103.5 of the Streets and Highways Code ex-
pressly authorizes the department to condemn for highways land which
is devoted to public use as a park.8 The only statutory limitation upon
the exercise of this power has been that the department could not begin
a proceeding in eminent domain unless the California Highway Com-
mission had first passed a resolution "declaring that public interest and
necessity require the acquisition... by the State... and that the real
property. . . therein described in such resolution is necessary for the
improvement."9  Under section 103 of the Streets and Highways Code,
1. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 1328, § 1, at 2534, as amended, Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524,
1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.).
2. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. City of Los Angeles, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 46, 77 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1969); Barry v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 199 Cal. App. 2d
359, 18 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1962); People ex reL Dep't of Pub. Works v. City of Los An-
geles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960); CALFOnANI SENATE PERMANENT
FAcTFNDIn Co0mnrrEE ON NATuRAL REsouRcEs, 3D PROGREss REPORT 111 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 3D PRoGRESS REPORT].
3. The legislature determines the necessity of state highways and designates
their terminal points, see CAL. STs. & H'WAYS CODE § 301-635 (West 1969, as
amended, Supp. 1971), but it is the California Highway Commission that de-
termines the actual locations of state highways between those terminals, see CAL. STs. &
H'wAys CODE H8 71, 75 (West 1969), and is primarily responsible for locating federal
highways, 23 U.S.C. H8 103, 117(a) (1970). Route selection of federal highways by
the state highway commission is, however, subject to final approval by the Secretary of
Transportation. 23 U.S.C. § 103(e) (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1655(a)(1) (1970).
4. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 70 (West 1969).
5. Id. § 102.
6. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 1240 (West Supp. 1971).
7. CAL. STs. & -'wAYs CODE § 90 (West 1969). The actual construction and
most of the planning is carried out by the Division of Highways.
8. Accord, CAL. Pun. RES. CODE § 5160 (West 1956).
9. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 102 (West 1969).
this resolution is conclusive evidence of the public necessity of the im-
provement and that the particular property is necessary therefor. 10
Attempts by the condemnees, and in one case by a citizen group,"
to curb the exercise of the power delegated to the state highway com-
mission to locate highways through public parks have been foreclosed
by the leading case of People ex rel. Depdrtment of Public Works v.
Chevalier.'2  In Chevalier the California Supreme Court held that the
conclusive effect accorded by the legislature to the condemning body's
finding of necessity precluded any judicial determination on the neces-
sity of the particular taking despite allegations of fraud, bad faith, or
abuse of discretion.
13
At a time when the availability of land resources is in increasingly
short supply,'" particularly in urban areas, and when environmental
concerns have only recently come into clear focus, the decision in Chev-
alier is most disturbing because it has meant, in effect, that use of prop-
erty as a highway is the best and most necessary use for property any-
where in the state without regard for the use to which that property is
presently devoted." 5
Code of Civil Procedure section 1241.7,16 however, reverses this
priority in regard to land which is presently appropriated for use as a
10. CAL. STs. & H'WAYS CODE § 103 (West 1969) provides: "The resolution of
the commission shall be conclusive evidence:
"a) Of the public necessity of such proposed public improvement.
"b) That such real property or interest therein is necessary therefor.
"c) That such proposed public improvement is planned or located in a manner
which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."
The apparent reason for this provision is the possibility of "endless litigation, and
perhaps conflicting determinations ... in separate condemnation actions brought to ob-
tain the parcels sought to carry out a single public improvement." People ex rel. Dep't of
Pub. Works v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 307, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (1959).
11. Barry v. Department of Pub. Works, 199 Cal. App. 2d 359, 18 Cal. Rptr. 637
(1962). The issue of standing was not raised in this case.
12. 52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).
13. Id. at 307, 340 P.2d at 603.
14. Agricultural and other open space areas are being prematurely forced out of
existence at a rate of approximately 150,000 acres per year. Report of the Senate Per-
manent Factfinding Comm. on Natural Resources, Section II, at 43, in 1 SUPPLEMENT
TO THE APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE (1967).
15. Report of the Assembly Comm. on Natural Resources, Planning, and Pub-
lic Works, Highway and Freeway Planning 8 in 1965 SUPPLEMENT TO APPENDIX TO
JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY [hereinafter cited as Highway and Freeway
Planning]. Limited qualifications of this conclusion appear in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 8560 (West 1970) (prohibiting public roadways from entering lands dedicated to
cemetery purposes) and CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 4104 (West Supp. 1971) (pro-
tecting state hospital lands).
16. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524, § 1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.), amending CAL.
CODE CIv. PROC. § 1241.7(b) (West Supp. 1971).
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state, regional, county, or city park.17  The section provides that ap-
propriation for park use establishes a rebuttable presumption that such
use is the best and most necessary use for the particular property.
Whenever such park property is sought to be acquired for state
highway purposes, the section authorizes the public agency owning the
park to bring an action for declaratory relief. Such an action must be
brought within 120 days after the highway commission gives notice of
its proposal.' In this action, the resolution of the commission is not
conclusive evidence of the public necessity of the improvement nor that
the particular property is necessary thereto.19 Furthermore, the duty is
expressly imposed upon the court to determine which use, a highway
or a park, is the best and most necessary use to the public for the park
property in question.
Enacted concurrently with section 1241.7, section 210.1 of the
Streets and Highways Code2 ° provides that in the planning and design of
highway projects, the Department of Public Works shall attempt to
avoid using park lands, but where such lands are necessary to the proj-
ect, the department shall, by special design and construction, attempt to
17. The protective scope of CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241.7 (West Supp. 1971)
has recently been extended to recreation, wildlife or waterfowl management areas, Cal.
Stat. 1969, ch. 357, § 1 at 872, and ecological reserves, Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 854, § 1, at
1589. In addition, a 1971 amendment provides the same protection against intrusion
by public utility structures. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 68, § 1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.)
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241.9(a) (West Supp. 1971) provides the same presumption of
best and most necessary public use to property owned by nonprofit corporations "having
the primary purpose of preserving areas in their natural condition" and used for the
"preservation of native plants, or native animals . . . or biotic communities ... .
Subsection (b) allows the nonprofit corporation owning such property to bring a
declaratory action whenever that property is sought for highway use.
18. Notice must take the form of a single publication in a newpaper of general
circulation, see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6061 (West 1966), and a written notice to the public
agency owning the park. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524, § 1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.),
amending CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1241.7 (West Supp. 1971).
19. "In such declaratory relief action, the resolution of the California Highway
Commission shall not be conclusive evidence of the matters set forth in section 103 of
the Streets and Highways Code [set forth in note 10 supra]." Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524,
§ 1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.), amending CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1241.7 (West Supp.
1971).
20. Section 210.1 provides in part:
"(a) The department and the commission, in the planning and design of high-
way projects, shall attempt to avoid using lands for public parks, and where such lands
are necessary for state highway purposes shall attempt to minimize the intrusion or im-
pact on such parks by special design, construction and landscape treatment so that the
highway will be harmonious with the environment. The department shall coordinate
and confer with appropriate public agencies responsible for park development during
the route planning, design and construction phase of a state highway project. The feasi-
bility of bypassing a public park by an alternative route shall be studied and included
in the report of alternate route studies to the commission."
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achieve harmony with the environment.2 1 Further, this section now re-
quires consultation with the appropriate public agencies responsible for
park development during all significant stages of the highway project
and compels study of the "feasibility of bypassing a public park by an
alternate route."
The purpose of this note is to show that the enactment of sections
1241.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 210.1 of the Streets and High-
ways Code was motivated by a legislative awareness of the importance
of park and other environmental values in land use planning generally
and highway planning in particular, and that these sections must there-
fore be construed in light of legislative declarations relating to such land
use planning.22 Further, this note will seek to show that, read in this
light, these sections constitute a bar to the taking of park property for
highway use except in unusual circumstances. Finally, this note will
attempt to expose the problems and weaknesses inherent in the legisla-
tive attempt to preserve public parklands from destruction by highways
and to suggest some possible solutions to these difficulties.
It should be made clear at the outset, however, that this note will
deal only with the protection afforded public parks under California
law. A substantial number of state highway projects are funded by the
federal government 23 and will be subject to the requirements of federal
as well as state law. 24  Nevertheless, for the considerable number of
highway projects undertaken solely by the state, parties seeking to pro-
tect public parks must look to California law.
Legislative Awareness of Environmental Values
In 1959 the legislature enacted section 250 of the Streets and High-
ways Code which declares that the construction of a statewide system
of freeways is essential to the future development of the state. More
recent legislative pronouncements, however, indicate that the methods
utilized to effect this policy have not conformed to other statewide
land use goals, particularly those related to environmental concerns.
21. Congress has enacted similar legislation in order to protect public parks in
federal highway projects. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). For a
legislative history of 23 U.S.C. § 138, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1194-95 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
22. "The Legislature finds and declares that future growth of the state should be
guided by an effective planning process and should proceed within the framework of
officially approved statewide goals and policies directed to land use." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65030 (West Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
23. The federal government has provided approximately 445.5 million of the 761
million dollars allocated by the state for highway construction in the 1970-71 budget.
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WORKS, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 93.
24. 23 U.S.C. H9 103-06 (1970).
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The first such pronouncement was made in 1965 when a state
assembly committee severely criticized the narrow approach taken by
the highway commission in performing its duties with respect to public
parks.25 Concurrently, the legislature amended section 90 of the Streets
and Highways Code to eliminate the requirement that all state highways
be located on the "most direct and practicable routes" between ter-
mini .2  A subsequent report issued by the California Senate Perma-
nent Factfinding Committee on Natural Resources concluded: "Cali-
fornia to date has been developing around its highways rather than in-
fluencing controlled development with the highway system being only
an integral portion thereof . .. 2 The commission also suggested
that the primary consideration by the highway commission should be
directed toward the alternatives available to avoid any portion of a pub-
lic park.
28
More recent amendments to the Streets and Highways Code mani-
fest serious legislative concern over the degradation of environmental
quality resulting from inadequate consideration of highway route loca-
tions . 0  Section 75.7, which requires the highway commission to pre-
pare and disseminate a report containing the basis for a route location
decision, was amended in 1970 to include consideration by the com-
25. In 1965 the California Assembly Committee on Natural Resources, Planning,
and Public Works found that "primary emphasis in the evaluation of routing alternatives
appears to be on engineering considerations" and "that there were serious questions con-
cerning the efficacy of the agency's consideration of the total impact of a given routing
alternative." Highway and Freeway Planning, supra note 15, at 5-6.
The committee found with respect to section 103.5 of the Streets and Highways
Code that the commission power to take park property for highway use represented "a
most extraordinary grant of power, and seriously question[ed] its justification." Id.
at 9.
26. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 1018, § 1, at 2651.
27. 3D PROGRS REPORT, supra note 2, at 114.
28. Id. at 112.
29. In this connection, THE CA iFORN ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON EN-
vioNm:tErAL QuALrIY, E moNrmrAL BILL OF RIGHTS 29 (1970) states: "In spite
of the obvious and critical relationship between environmental quality and the transpor-
tation network, there are, at present, no effective mechanisms for ensuring that trans-
portation facilities conform to and support our environmental goals." The committee
concluded that "[u]nrestrained use of the automobile threatens to affect both the health
of millions of California citizens and the natural resources of the State." Id. at 6.
30. By 1968 state highway system mileage totaled 16,269 miles. BusINESs &
TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, CALIORNIA DEP'T OF PuBuc WORKS, THE CALnFORmA FREE-
wAY AND EXPRESSWAY SYsTEM, section I, at 44 (1969). That same year the legislature
created the Environmental Quality Study Council and declared that an in-depth study
was necessary "[tio define the interrelationship of resources management, land use and
transportation policies, and other matters, including noise emissions, that affect environ-
mental quality." Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 1380, § 1, at 2711 (repealed Cal. Stat. 1970, ch.
346, § 9 at 744).
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mission of the "[noise impact upon the communities affected" and
"[e]nvironmental values and impact on the ecology of the area.""3
Another recent addition to the code authorizes the highway commission
to expend monies from the state highway fund to contract with spe-
cialists in such fields as fish and wildlife management and park and
recreation management in order to obtain "an independent evaluation
of routing proposals."3" In addition, the legislature has created the
Resources Protection Account,3 3 monies from which are to be used
"for the preservation and enhancement of natural resources . . . af-




More comprehensive legislative pronouncements of the impor-
tance of environmental values in land use planning are expressed in
the Environmental Quality Act of 1970.3' Under the provisions of this
act, the policy of this state is declared to be to "[e]nsure that the
long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding criterion
in public decisions. "36 The legislature has also declared that man has
a moral obligation to protect, enhance and make the highest use of land
and resources he holds in trust for future generations.
37
Certain environmental values will inevitably be destroyed no mat-
ter where a highway is located. Such destruction, however, is maxi-
mized by inadequate consideration of alternative route locations. The
above mentioned sections constitute an implicit recognition of this possi-
bility. Moreover, they indicate that the highway authorities can no
longer ignore this possibility and, in fact, must actively seek to avoid
it.
Construction of Best and Most Necessary Use
Section 1241.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes a pre-
sumption that use of property as a park is the "best and most necessary
public use for such property. '3 8 That section also provides that where
such park property is sought to be acquired for highway purposes, an
action for declaratory relief may be brought to determine the question
of which use is the best and most necessary use for the public.3 9 The
presumption established by section 1241.7 is one affecting the burden
of proof and the party against whom it is invoked (in this case the high-
31. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 865, § 4, at 1603.
32. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 85 (West Supp. 1971).
33. CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE § 8600 (West Supp. 1971).
34. Id. § 8601.
35. Id. §§ 21000-21151.
36. Id. § 21001(d).
37. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 565.4 (West Supp. 1971).
38. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524, § 1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.), amending CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241.7(b) (West Supp. 1971).
39. Id.
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way authorities) has the burden of proving the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact-that park use is the best and most necessary public use-
by a preponderance of the evidence.
4 0
By imposing a duty on the courts to determine which use is the
"best and most necessary public use," section 1241.7 contemplates a
two-step process. The first step requires a determination of which use is
the "most necessary." Since the presumption operates in favor of the
park, the burden is on the highway authorities to show that use of
park property is most necessary to the highway, i.e., that use of the park
is unavoidable. Where the highway authorities fail to establish this, the
court should refuse to sanction the taking. Where the highway authori-
ties establish that use of park property is unavoidable, the court must
then take the second step and determine which use is the "best use" for
the particular property.
Support for the proposition that focus should initially be directed
to whether use of park property is really necessary to the construction of
a highway may be found in the provisions of section 1241.7. The
statute provides that the resolution of the highway commission is not
conclusive evidence of the matters set forth in section 103 of the Streets
and Highways Code.41  Thus, section 1241.7 nullifies Chevalier42 in
this context and opens three questions for decision heretofore closed by
section 103: the public necessity of the project, the necessity of the par-
ticular property to the project and whether the proposed project is
planned or located in a manner which will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and least private injury. As to the first, it is unlikely
the legislature intended the courts to question the legislative decision
on the necessity of the highway,4" a matter peculiarly with the legisla-
tive province. The second and third questions present, in effect, the
same issue for decision: whether locating the highway through a public
park is necessary.
If the court is initially only concerned with the necessity of locating
the highway through a public park and the presumption of section
1241.7 operates in favor of the park, the burden is on the highway au-
thorities to show that the taking of park property is necessary to the con-
struction of the highway. However, in view of the environmental des-
poliation caused by a modern highway44 and the fact that section 1241.7
40. CAL. Evm. CODE § 606 (West 1966).
41. See note 10 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
43. See note 3 supra. See Holloway v. Purcell, 35 Cal. 2d 220, 231, 217 P.2d
665, 672 (1950), where the court stated: "The Legislature has adopted a policy of free-
way construction in the public interest."
44. In 1969, smog caused an estimated $250 million loss to California agriculture.
ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 18. The Pure Air Act of 1968,
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
was specifically designed to afford protection against highway intru-
sion, it is clear that the presumption of "most necessary" cannot be over-
come merely by a showing of expediency or convenience. If sections
1241.7 and 210.1 of the Streets and Highways Code, both of which
declare the policy of avoiding parks, are to have any meaning, "most
necessary" can only mean that the highway commission must show
that use of park property is unavoidable in determining the location of
the highway.
The proposition that considerations of expediency are not suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of "most necessary" is supported
simply by the enactment of sections 1241.7 and 210.1.11 This is so
because considerations of expediency such as cost, directness of route,
and community disruption often make park property extremely desir-
able for highway purposes.46  Since the public already owns the land,
there is no need to pay for acquiring the right of way,47 and since open
space parks are always free of residential or commercial development,
relocation costs and community disruption are minimal. These con-
siderations, however, are common to all highway development and if
the legislature intended such expediency factors to be on equal footing
with the policy of preserving parklands, thus allowing the use of park-
land where practially avoidable, there would have been no need for
sections 1241.7 and 210.1. As the United States Supreme Court has re-
cently stated in a similar context:
The few green havens that are public parks were not to be lost
unless there were truly unusual factors present in a particular case
or the cost of community disruption resulting from alternative
routes reached extraordinary magnitudes. 48
CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39080-96 (West Supp. 1971), declared: "The Legislature
finds and declares:
"(a) That the emission of pollutants from motor vehicles is the primary cause of
air pollution in many portions of the state.
"(b) That the control and elimination of such pollutants is of prime importance for
the protection and preservation of the public health and well-being, and for the pre-
vention of irritation to the senses, interference with visibility and damage to vegetation
and property." Id. § 39081. With regard to noise pollution the Environmental Quality
Study Council Act, as amended, declared at section 16000 of the Government Code:
"The Legislature finds that . . . (b) The proliferation of noise from transportation
sources have led to the exposure of large sectors of the populace to an unacceptable de-
gree of noise." Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1042, § 1, at 2026 (repealed Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 346,
§ 9, at 744).
45. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
where the Supreme Court was construing the federal statutory policy of protecting park-
lands from highway intrusion and concluded that "the very existence of the statutes indi-
cates that protection of parkland was to be given paramount importance." Id. at 412.
46. Id. at 411-12.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 413.
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The burden should be placed on the highway authorities to show
that the costs of alternative routes avoiding the park would reach "ex-
traordinary magnitudes." To construe sections 1241.7 and 210.1 other-
wise would deprive them of all serious purpose. As the late Justice
Black said, "[p]arks are not to be condemned in order to try and save
a few dollars on a multimillion dollar highway project. '4 9
Where the highway commission has failed to establish use of park
property is unavoidable, the court should refuse to sanction the taking
of park property for highway use. Where the commission has estab-
lished that use of park property is unavoidable, the court must then
consider the importance of the park and balance that importance against
the necessity of locating the highway through the park-i.e., determine
the "best use" of that land.
Determination of "best use," however, connotes a wide variety of
choices. It is readily apparent that the legislature did not intend the
court to consider which use, among several possible uses, is the "best"
in an action brought under section 1241.7. Rather, the court is only
concerned with two competing choices-a highway and a park-and
must determine which is the "better use" for the particular property.
As to the particular park, the court should consider its importance
to people in the area-the extent of use and for what purposes? What
wildlife does it embrace?5" Are there other parks nearby? It is rele-
vant to note here that the legislature has declared the policy of this state
to provide its citizens with "enjoyment of aesthetic, natural, scenic
[and] historic environmental qualities"51 and to prevent the extinc-
tion of fish and wildlife species and "preserve for future generations
representations of all plant and animal communities." 2 The legislature
has also found that
[T]he rapid growth and spread of urban development is encroaching
upon or eliminating many open areas. . . having significant scenic
or aesthetic values, which areas and spaces if preserved and main-
tained in their present open state would constitute important physi-
cal, social, aesthetic or economic assets to existing and impending
urban and metropolitan development.
5 3
Also the people have declared in an amendment to the California Con-
stitution that it is in the
best interest of the state to maintain, preserve [and] conserve...
open space lands . . . to assure the use and enjoyment of natural
49. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968, 971 (1970) (dissenting to denial of certiorari).
50. See id. at 977 (Douglas, L, dissenting).
51. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21001(b) (West Supp. 1971).
52. Id. § 21001(c).
53. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6951 (West 1966).
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resources and scenic beauty for the economic and social well being
of the state and its citizens.
54
With more specific reference to public parks, the legislature has asserted
that it is the responsibility of the state to provide recreation areas for its
citizens and that present facilities for this purpose are inadequate.:"
Thus, the recreational, environmental, and aesthetic value of the park
must be determined. The court should then consider what impact a
highway will have on these values. For example, where the highway
commission is merely seeking to widen an existing road on the outskirts
of a park, the impact may be minimal. On the other hand, where the
park is located in an urban area with a high population density or where
the park embraces unique plant or animal life, these factors alone may
preclude invasion by a highway. In this connection, the California
Senate Permanent Factfinding Committee on Natural Resources stated:
[Piroposed highway alignments can be moved almost anywhere on
the map, effecting only perhaps the relative utility or ultimate costs
thereof. Parks, however, are designated as such primarily because
of their unique character which affords a major contribution to pre-
servation of scenic wonders, historical features or recreational
values. With regard to natural features involved, these cannot be
replaced, reconstructed or relocated at any cost.56
Thus, the legislature has set the policy of preserving public parklands
from unwarranted highway intrusion, 57 and section 1241.7 of the Code
of Civil Procedure imposes on the courts the duty to apply this policy.
The Inherent Shortcomings of Section 1241.7
Where the agency owning a public park brings an action under
section 1241.7 to prevent the taking of park property for highway pur-
poses, that section may be interposed as a bar to such taking except in
unusual circumstances. Two conditions, however, must be satisfied be-
fore the action to determine the best and most necessary use under sec-
tion 1241.7 may be brought. One condition requires the agency to act
within 120 days after publication and written notification by the high-
way commission that park property is sought to be acquired for high-
54. CAL. CONST., art. XXVIII, § 1.
55. "California today is facing an overwhelming unmet existing and projected need
in a wide range of outdoor recreation opportunities, especially in and near rapidly grow-
ing urban areas throughout the state. The primary reason for this growing deficiency is
the persistent refusal of public officials at all levels of government to assign sufficient pri-
ority to recreation as a legitimate human and social need." Report of the Assembly
Comm. on Natural Resources, Planning and Public Works, The Recreation Gap 43 in
1968 SUPPLEMENT TO THE APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY
(1968). The legislative finding that park facilities are inadequate is embodied in CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 5096.3 (West Supp. 1971).
56. 3D PROGRESs REPORT, note 2 supra, section I, at 111.
57. See note 20 supra.
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way use.58 The provision is, in effect, a statute of limitation, and if the
action for declaratory relief is not brought within the 120-day period,
the right to bring such action is waived.
Satisfaction of the other condition may present greater difficulty.
Section 1241.7 requires that property be dedicated to park use prior to
the initiation of route location studies before the right to bring declara-
tory relief action accrues.59 Since state highway projects require several
years of advance planning, this condition precedent will pose a problem
in many newly developed communities where highway route location
studies preceded dedication to park use.
The equivocality of section 1241.7 concerning action by the park
agency creates even more basic difficulties. Under the provisions of
the statute "an action for declaratory relief may be brought only by the
public agency owning such park."6
The decision whether to challenge the taking of the park is thus
left to the sole discretion of an agency which is neither subject nor per-
haps even sensitive to the demands of the public. In addition, section
1241.7 expressly provides that where the declaratory action is not
brought pursuant to that section, i.e. by the park agency, the presump-
tion of "best and most necessary use" does not apply. Thus, it ap-
pears that the conclusive effect given to the highway commission's reso-
lution of necessity under section 103 of the Streets and Highways Code 6'
is thereby resinstated. 62 Clearly, section 1241.7 was not intended to be
invoked by a member of the public. Senator Milton Marks, the original
author of section 1241.7, introduced a bill in the 1971 session of the
state legislature to amend that section to give every citizen the right to
bring an action to determine the best and most necessary use for park
property when such property is sought for highway use; 63 that bill was
defeated.
6 4
Although section 1241.7 has been part of California law since
1968 and Division of Highway officials admit that several proposed
58. See note 18 & accompanying text supra.
59. Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524, § 1 (West Cal. Legis. Serv.), amending CAL. CODE
CiV. PROC. § 1241.7(b) (West Supp. 1971).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 103 (West 1969) set out in full at note 10 supra.
62. The last sentence of section 1241.7 provides: "When a declaratory relief ac-
tion, with respect to such property being sought for highway purposes. .. may not be
brought pursuant to this subdivision, the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section
[establishment of a rebuttable presumption of appropriation for the best and most neces-
sary public use] shall not apply." Cal. Stat. 1971, ch. 1524, § 1 (West Cal. Legis.
Serv.), amending CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1241.7 (West Supp. 1971). This provision is
an implicit recognition that other avenues may be available to challenge the taking of
park property.
63. S.B. 103, Cal. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1971).
64. See CALIFORNIA SENATE WEEELY HISTORY, Jan. 3, 1972, at 44.
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routes will slice through public parks,6 5 that section has yet to be
used as an effective basis for challenging the proposed taking of park
property. 6  Therefore, unless the protection afforded park land under
section 1241.7 may be invoked at the instance of a member of the pub-
lic-the real party in interest-the statute will apparently remain un-
used.
Remedy by Mandamus
Despite the inadequacies of the protection afforded public parks by
the legislature in section 1241.7, a writ of mandamus1 is available to
local property owners or taxpayers to challenge the condemnation of
park property. This writ may be issued to the agency which owns the
threatened park or to the Department of Public Works.
Generally two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of
the writ: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part
of the respondent; (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the pe-
titioner to the performance of that duty.68  Where a local property
owner or taxpayer seeks to prevent the destruction of a neighborhood
park, under California law, both these requirements are met.
Right of the Petitioner
At the outset, those seeking to prevent the destruction of park
lands are faced with the restrictive rule of Chevalier69 as applied by a
California Court of Appeal in Barry v. Department of Public Works.
7
1
The Barry court held that on the basis of Chevalier no condemnee, pub-
lic or private, may challenge the taking. The supreme court in Cheva-
lier, however, was faced with a challenge by a private condemnee, and
its rationale does not support such a conclusion when public property
is to be condemned. Chevalier was decided on the principle that the
private landowner is adequately protected by his constitutional right to
just compensation, and where this right is protected, the motive of the
65. Interview with Robert J. Speigel, Public Information, Dep't of Pub. Works,
Division of Highways, Dec. 1, 1971.
66. Interview with Robert R. Buell, Staff, Legal Division of Dep't of Public Works,
Feb. 25, 1972. In La Raza Unida of Southern Alameda County v. Volpe, Civ. No.
C-71 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 72-1059, 9th Cir., Jan. 12, 1972,
the California Environmental Quality Act was pleaded as an alternative basis for chal-
lenging the proposed condemnation of park land but was ignored by the court because
relief was granted upon the basis of federal law.
67. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1085-86 (West 1955).
68. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 491, 487 P.2d
1193, 1199, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559 (1971).
69. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
70. 199 Cal. App. 2d 359, 18 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1962).
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condemning body is not his concern.7 ' The private owner then has
no right to question the determination, by the condemnor, that his prop-
erty is necessary to the project so long as he is justly compensated for
the taking. The language concerning just compensation, however,
clearly does not apply where public property is taken because the state
already owns the land, and no compensation need be made.
The decision in Chevalier rested on another ground which is in-
applicable to the condemnation of public property. The court reasoned
that allowing each landowner whose property lay in the path of a pro-
posed public improvement to challenge the taking would result in "end-
less litigation, and perhaps conflicting determinations on the question of
'necessity' in separate condemnation actions brought to . . .carry out
a single public improvement." 2 Since only one mandamus action may
be brought to challenge the taking of a particular park, there is no
possibility of "endless litigation and perhaps conflicting determina-
tions." Thus, the Chevalier rule should not serve to bar a challenge to
the condemnation action through mandamus brought on behalf of the
public.
The "clear and beneficial" right of the petitioner is the same
whether mandamus is sought against the park agency or the highway
authorities. The writ will issue at the instance of a private individual
only where he can assert some particular right or interest to be secured or
protected independent of that which he holds with the public at large.73
Although the right to enjoy the facilities of a public park is common to
all, it is particularly significant to local residents. It is the value of
property within the immediate vicinity of the park which is affected by
the invasion of a highway and the resulting increase in traffic, noise, and
air pollution. It is the local community that loses an important part of
its character when a park is destroyed. Certainly, the local resident has
a clear and beneficial interest in protecting the neighborhood park. 74 At
any rate, where the issue is one of public interest, the requirement of a
clear and beneficial interest has been dispensed with or at least greatly
relaxed.75
71. 52 Cal. 2d 299, 307, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (1959).
72. Id.
73. Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 351, 254 P.2d 6, 9-10 (1953).
74. Cf. Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 644-45, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 366 (1963). In Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175, 180 (D.D.C.
1960) the court ruled that "[l]and dedicated to the use of the public for park purposes is
held in trust for that use, and a resident of the city. . . in which the park is located may
maintain a suit in equity to prevent diversion of the use of such land ... " The con-
templated diversion in that case was for highway purposes.
75. See, e.g., People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487
P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971); Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345,
95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948).
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[W]here the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the re-
lator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having
the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. 76
Clearly, a local property owner or taxpayer is a proper party to chal-
lenge the imminent destruction of park property by mandamus.
77
Duties of the Park Agency and the Highway Authorities
The other basic prerequisite to the issuance of mandamus is a
"clear, present and usually ministerial" duty upon the part of the re-
spondent. 78 Section 1241.7 imposes no affirmative duty upon the park
agency to bring the declaratory relief action. 79  It is inconceivable, how-
ever, that the protection afforded public park land by the legislature °
could be ignored or nullified by the arbitrary refusal of the park agency
to act. Mandamus therefore should lie to compel the park agency to
make an investigation to determine whether or not an action should be
brought.8" Thus, the park agency cannot simply ignore the destruction
of park property but must critically evaluate the total impact the loss of
the park will have on the local community. 2  If there is any doubt as
to the best and most necessary use of the park property, the agency
should bring a declaratory action to challenge the feasibility of the con-
demnation.
With respect to the highway authorities, the duties "which the law
specifically enjoins"83 are explicit and free of ambiguities. Under the
provisions of the Environmental Quality Act of 197084 "[a]ll state agen-
cies, boards, and commissions" are required to give detailed considera-
tion to environmental effects "on any project they propose to carry out
76. Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 357, 196 P.2d 562, 566 (1948), quoting
35 AM. JUR. Mandamus § 320, at 73 (1941).
77. In Nickols v. Commissioners of Middlesex County, 341 Mass. 13, 166 N.E.2d
911 (1960), it was held that taxpayers have standing as citizens to enforce a public duty
by mandamus to prevent injuries to the shores and woods surrounding Walden Pond.
See also, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.
1970), where the court said: 'The public interest in environmental resources . . . is a
legally protected interest affording .. . responsible representatives of the public stand-
ing to obtain judicial review of agency action alleged to be in contravention of that pub-
lic interest."
78. See note 68 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
80. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1241.7 (West Supp. 1971); CAL. STS. & H'wAYs
CODE § 210.1 (West 1969).
81. Cf. Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 355, 196 P.2d 562, 565 (1948);
accord, Ballard v. Andersen, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
82. See text accompanying notes 21-37 supra.
83. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085 (West 1955).
84. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE 88 21000-151 (West Supp. 1971).
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which could have a significant effect on the environment."85  In addi-
tion, section 75.7 of the Streets and Highways Code specifically requires
the highway commission to consider the noise and environmental im-
pact of the area affected by a route location decision. Finally, section
210.1 of the Streets and Highways Code commands the highway au-
thorities to attempt to avoid public park lands. These statutes impose
clear and present duties upon the agencies responsible for the planning
and construction of state highway projects, i.e., those agencies are under
a duty to consider environmental impact and must make a meaningful
attempt to avoid using park lands. Moreover, since these duties do not
involve the exercise of judgment and discretion over whether they are
to be performed, they should be considered as clearly ministerial.8 6
Thus, as a first step, mandamus will lie to compel consideration of rele-
vant factors and adherence to the statutory policy of avoiding public
parks.
87
Where the highway authorities establish that these statutory duties
have been performed, i.e., that all relevant factors have been considered
and an attempt made to avoid park lands, mandamus is also available to
control the abuse of discretion88 where there has been a clear error of
judgment. Although the scope of judicial review is narrow, the range
of discretion permitted the highway authorities with regard to parks is
similarly narrow. A public park is not to be invaded by a highway un-
less it is unavoidable.8 9 It is the duty of the courts to assure that this
discretion is not abused.
Summary
Thus, the restrictive rule of Chevalier is inapplicable to the con-
demnation of a public park. Where a public park is sought to be con-
demned for highway use, local property owners and taxpayers have a
85. Id. § 21100.
86. Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220, 223-24, 293 P.2d 6, 8 (1956). When "a
statute requires an officer to do a prescribed act upon a prescribed contingency, his func-
tions are ministerial." Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13
Cal. 2d 75, 83, 87 P.2d 848, 853 (1939).
87. Cf. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, - F. Supp. -, 1 ENVIRON-
MENTAL L REP. 20346, 20349 (D.D.C. Cir. July 23, 1971), where the court concluded
that the National Environmental Policy Act "mandates a particular sort of careful and
informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable duties. The review-
ing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits . . . unless it be
shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or
clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the decision was reached
procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors
-conducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse."
88. Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411 P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966);
Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 105 P. 582 (1909).
89. See text accompanying notes 40-56 supra.
clear and beneficial interest in the preservation of that park. Further-
more, the statutory provisions mentioned above impose clear and pres-
ent duties upon those agencies responsible for highway development to
consider all relevant factors and make a good faith attempt to avoid the
unnecessary sacrifice of parklands for highway use. Therefore, man-
damus will lie to control abuse of discretion by the highway commis-
sion in selecting a route through an existing public park. In addition,
the writ should lie to compel the park agency to affirmatively evaluate
the effect the condemnation will have on the local community before it
decides not to bring an action under section 1241.7. In either event,
the public interest can be adequately protected against arbitrary ad-
ministrative action.
Legislative Solutions
Several means are available to remedy the inadequacies of section
1241.7. One simple solution was embodied in Senate Bill 1109 (now
section 1241.7) as originally introduced.9" In its original form that
bill would have imposed as a condition to allowing the condemnation of
park property, a duty on the condemnor to substitute property of equiv-
alent value. Section 104.1 of the Streets and Highways Code, in fact, au-
thorizes the Department of Public Works to condemn real property for
such exchange purposes. Such a provision obviates the necessity of the
delicate balancing process that follows a determination, under section
1241.7 in its present form, that park property is unavoidable. An-
other virtue of such a provision is that its implicit recognition that preser-
vation of public parklands is equally as important in our society as further
construction of highways is easily translatable into meaningful action
since condemned park property would be replaced. This provision was
deleted before enactment.
Another possible legislative solution would be to amend section
1241.7 so as to require the park agency to bring a declaratory action
whenever park property is threatened by highway construction. This
requirement would eliminate any doubts concerning the duty of the
park agency to act and would thus assure that the public interest in pre-
serving parklands would be adequately protected.
A more comprehensive and decisive solution would be to immu-
nize public parks from the eminent domain powers delegated to the
Department of Public Works. Such a solution, however, is perhaps too
rigid since park lands, like highways, are not always located in a man-
ner that is most compatible with the greatest public good.
Finally, the legislature could make route location decisions of the
highway commission explicitly subject to broad judicial review. This
90. S.B. 1109, as introduced April 16, 1968.
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solution would allow those removed from the initial decision-making
process and thus free of private pressures to evaluate and balance the
relevant factors. No legitimate interest is served by immunizing what
is in effect a public decision from public scrutiny.
Conclusion
In section 1241.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure the legislature
has manifested its awareness of the importance of public parks and the
fact that they are being unnecessarily sacrificed to highway use. To
translate this awareness into meaningful action, however, the public
must be allowed to assert its right to protect public parks. That the
transportation network of highways has been a vital factor in the eco-
nomic development of our state cannot be disputed. It is also evident
that the price paid for this quantitative growth in terms of environmental
quality has been extremely high. Unfortunately, our legislature has rec-
ognized the problem but failed to take adequate action to remedy it.
Michael Obrand*
Member, Second Year Class.
